The
United States Embargo Against Cuba: A Counterproductive Policy in
Dire
Need of Reform
Dr. Elizabeth Boles
December 5, 2003
Table of Contents
1.1
– Purpose 4
1.2
– Contribution 5
1.3
– Why Now? 6
1.4
– Time for Reform 7
2.1
– History and Specifics of the Embargo 8
2.3
– Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917 9
2.3.1
– The Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 9
2.3.2
– The CDA’s Measures that Tighten the Embargo 10
2.3.3
– The CDA’s Provisions to Support the Cuban People 11
2.4.1
– The Cuban Liberty and Solidarity Act of 1996 11
2.4.2
– Title I: Strengthening International Sanctions against the Castro Regime 12
2.4.3
– Title II: Assistance to a Free Cuba 12
2.4.4
– Title III: Protection of the Property Rights of U.S. Nationals 12
2.4.5
– Title IV: Exclusion of Certain Aliens from Entry into the U.S. 13
2.5
– Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 13
3.1.1
– Actors and Arguments: the Pro-embargo Position 14
3.1.2
– The Miami-Cuban Influence 15
3.1.3
– The Moral Argument 16
3.1.4
– The Embargo will Fall Castro 16
3.2.1
Pro-engagement: Castro did not Fall During Cuba’s Economic Crisis 16
3.2.2
– The Embargo Hurts the Cuban People 17
3.2.3
– The Embargo Hurts the American People 18
3.2.4
– Engagement and the Flow of Ideas 19
3.3.5
– The Role of the International Community 20
4.1
– A Failed Policy that Must be Reformed 20
4.2
– Toward the Future 21
4.3
– A Different Approach 22
End
Notes 24
Bibliography 30
1.1– Purpose
Scholars have written a wealth of literature
in the past regarding the U.S. embargo against Cuba. Authors have backed the policy, claiming that it will eventually
fall Fidel Castro, which, they argue, will lead to a democratic transition in
Cuba. Critics claim that the policy has
failed because it has not weakened Castro’s stronghold on power. They contend that if the U.S. hopes to take
part in the democratic transition in Cuba, it must adopt a proactive policy
towards Cuba, normalizing relations and thus insuring that U.S. interests will
be represented when such a transition takes place. Castro is a 76-year-old man and a transition of power is almost
inevitable in the near future. While
there are no signs that Castro’s power is waning, his days are numbered and the
growing support for democracy amongst Cubans, evidenced by Oswaldo Payá’s
pro-democracy Varela project, leads many to believe that Castro’s death will be
followed by a transition to democracy.
Therefore, opponents of the embargo insist that the U.S. could further
its interests by establishing bilateral relations with the Cuban government,
positioning itself to oversee the transition of power when it occurs.
The intention of this work is to examine the
U.S. embargo against Cuba, in terms of its utility in achieving the stated
objectives of the policy. It is not an
attempt to back Castro, nor is it an attempt to justify the repressive tactics
he utilizes to silence his opposition.
It does not contend that the normalization of relations with Cuba will
automatically lead to a transition of power.
However, historically, policies of engagement have been far more successful
in achieving transitions of power and I contest that the situation in Cuba is
no different. A policy of engagement is
self-serving to U.S. interests, as it would benefit both Cuban and American
citizens and would position the U.S. to partake in Cuba’s transitional process. The current U.S. embargo allows Castro to
attribute the problems in Cuba to the harsh economic policy. While this is not entirely accurate, Castro
has utilized this rhetoric to instill a Nationalist sentiment in the Cuban population,
which strengthens, rather than destabilizes Castro by legitimizing the
inefficient socialist policies his government backs. This undermines the effects of the embargo policy, producing
results that are contradictory to the intentions of the policy.
“The fundamental goal of the United States
policy toward Cuba is to promote a peaceful transition to a stable, democratic
form of government and respect for human rights.”[i] The criteria for determining the success of
the policy are as follows: was the objective achieved, at least in part? And how much have the sanctions contributed
to a positive outcome?[ii] I will confine my “examination to changes in
the policies and capabilities of”[iii]
the Cuban government to determine the impact of the embargo on the Castro
regime. The U.S. has undertaken “a
trade embargo, an invasion of Cuba, assassination attempts [against Castro],
and multilateral pressures”[iv]
to destabilize Castro, but he has proved resilient to all measures, none of
which have “move[ed] Cuba any closer to democracy and a market economy.”[v] It is thus apparent that the objective of
the embargo has not been achieved, nor has the policy resulted in positive
outcomes. If Washington intends on promoting
a democratic transition in Cuba it must reform its policy. Engagement is much more conductive to the
promotion of U.S. interests and only through such a policy will the U.S.
achieve its goals with regards to Cuba.
1.2
– Contribution
Many scholars have put forth the argument
that rapprochement with Cuba is more in line with the goals of the U.S. in
respect to Cuba, but they often condition such an engagement on a commitment
from Castro to stop the oppression of his dissidents and on the return of the expropriations
taken during the Cuban Revolution. While
these are no doubt desirable goals, Castro is unwilling to undertake such
actions. This does not mean that the
U.S. should not move forward to establish bilateral relations with the Castro
government. “The United States should
endeavor to put the negative past in the historical archives where they belong,
and look toward the future of the Cuban people beyond Castro.”[vi] The U.S. embargo is an anti-Castro policy
that does not account for its future consequences. It isolates America from the international community, while
simultaneously overlooking the interests of both American and Cuban citizens. Thus, it is counterproductive in promoting
the interests of the U.S.
1.3 – Why Now?
The
United States embargo against Cuba has been at the center of academic and
political debates concerning U.S. foreign policy for better than four
decades. However, with the 2004
congressional and presidential elections on the horizon, the policy has gained
significant attention at the White House, on Capital Hill and in the media in
recent months. When initially imposed,
the policy drew wide support both domestically and internationally due to its
utility in achieving the objectives of the Cold War. Containment was the goal of virtually all of Washington’s
policies towards communist nations and the embargo against Cuba served this end
by denying the Cuban government the benefits of economic relations with the
U.S., which retarded the spread of communism in the Western Hemisphere.
However, the fall of the
USSR in 1989 marked the end of the Cold War, yet the U.S. continues to impose
an embargo on trade with Cuba. The
objectives of the policy have been revised now that communism is no longer an
international threat, but the means of achieving the Washington’s goals remain
extremely similar. Washington continues to prohibit economic relations with
Cuba, citing the fact that such engagement would “prop up”[vii]
the Castro regime, which it contends would undermine the stated goal of
“promoting a democratic transition”[viii]
on the island, despite increasing evidence to the contrary.
International
as well as domestic opposition to the embargo has heightened since the end of
the Cold War. The international
community claims that the policy has failed “to destabilize the Castro regime,”[ix]
while providing “Castro with a scapegoat, allowing him to blame any economic
hardships on the American blockade.”[x] From this perspective, the embargo actually
strengthens Castro’s power, which is counterproductive to the achievement of a
democratic transition in Cuba.
“Opponents also argue that in other places around the world communism
was defeated not by isolation, but by engagement.”[xi] General Wesley Clark, in a statement made at
America Rocks the Vote: Democratic Candidates Forum, reaffirmed this by
attributing America’s victory in the Cold War to engagement with Eastern Europe,
rather than to policies of isolation.[xii] Thus, there is no longer a consensus as to
the effectiveness of the U.S. embargo against Cuba in achieving its stated objectives.
On November 5, 2003 the
United Nations General Assembly voted on a symbolic resolution to end the U.S.
economic sanctions against Cuba by a record margin of 179-3 (the 12th
consecutive year the resolution was passed), demonstrating the overwhelming
opposition in the international community to the embargo.[xiii] Moreover, the House of Representatives voted
227-188 in September to attach a provision to a Transportation and Treasury
appropriation bill that would prohibit funding of the ban on travel to Cuba and
the Senate followed suit in October – just two weeks after Bush called for
heightened enforcement of the ban – by a margin of 59-36.[xiv] However, Republican leaders in Congressional
Committee removed the language that dismantled the funding mechanism of the
Cuba travel ban in response to President George W. Bush’s vow to veto any bill
containing such language, but the debate remains intense as to whether the U.S.
should normalize relations with Cuba.
Therefore, I feel that the time is appropriate to reexamine the U.S.
embargo policy against Cuba in order to determine its effectiveness in
promoting U.S. interests, as well the impact it is having on the Cuban people.
When
Washington instituted the Cuban embargo it had clearly stated objectives: “overthrow
[of Castro] and containment.”[xv] The international community largely
supported these goals, as “all members of the Organization of American States
(OAS) except Mexico had broken diplomatic and trade relations with Cuba.”[xvi] However, by 1975 support for the embargo was
waning, as the OAS voted to lift sanctions against Cuba, prompting the U.S. to
adopt conditions for the removal of its sanctions.[xvii] According to Washington, if Castro met the
conditions, the embargo would be lifted.
Four conditions were set by the end of the 1970’s – Cuba had to: 1) end
efforts to spread revolution, 2) sever its ties with the USSR, 3) remove its
troops from Africa, 4) show greater respect for human rights.[xviii] As of 1991, “the four U.S. imposed
conditions to begin a process of rapprochement had been met, or – in the case
of human rights – were at least being seriously addressed”[xix]
(as reported by the State Departments’ Human Rights Report of 1989). However, Washington did not lift the embargo
and instead decided to tighten the sanctions against Cuba, hoping that such
measures would cause the downfall of Castro.
In 1992 Congress passed the
Cuban Democracy Act (CDA) and in 1996 it passed the Cuban Liberty and
Democratic Solidarity Act (also referred to as LIBERTAD and Helms-Burton). Both provisions dramatically tightened the
embargo, but neither toppled Castro.
Instead these bills increased the international opposition to the
embargo, further alienating the U.S. from the international community, while
simultaneously strengthening Castro’s contention that Cuba’s problems are the
result of the harsh U.S. policy. Thus,
the embargo injures U.S. interests not only with respect to Cuba, but also with
its most valued trading partners.
Canada, Mexico and the
European Union strongly oppose the embargo and the U.S. has no interests in
Cuba that are worth placing the vital relationships with Canada, Europe and
Mexico at risk.[xx] Castro is going to die of natural causes
soon, not as a result of the embargo, and the U.S. must adopt a policy that is
aligned with the interests of the international community if it wants to
influence the structure of the post-Castro Cuban government. At present, Cubans would likely seek
assistance in the transitional process from the nations with whom they have
diplomatic and economic relations, leaving the U.S. isolated from the
process. This obviously is contrary to
the objectives of the U.S. in respect to Cuba.
Therefore, the U.S. must reform its policy before Castro passes,
ensuring that it plays a role in the transitional process.
2.1 – History and Specifics of the Embargo
While the scope of this analysis
does not permit a detailed history of the embargo, it is necessary to highlight
the most important developments, which form the current policy. I will summarize the Trading with the Enemy
Act of 1917(TWEA), the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992(CDA), the Cuban Liberty and
Democracy Act of 1996 (Helms-Burton) and the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export
Enhancement Act of 2000 (Cuban Food and Medicine Security Act), in order to
establish a basic understanding of the current policy.
2.2 – Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917
President Eisenhower first
banned the export of U.S. goods to Cuba in 1960 by executive order.[xxi] This came in response to the nationalization
of U.S. properties without compensation that occurred during the Cuban
Revolution.[xxii] In reaction to Castro’s alliance with the
USSR and the Cuban Missile Crisis, President Kennedy imposed an “embargo on all
trade with Cuba using his authority under the Trading with the Enemy Act,”[xxiii]
including all travel-related transactions with Cuba,[xxiv]
in 1962. However, “additional trade
restrictions were imposed … in the 1960-62 period. Therefore, by the time President Kennedy proclaimed a total trade
embargo, trade between the U.S. and Cuba was already essentially cut off.”[xxv]
The TWEA allows the
president to declare a national emergency and to prohibit relations with a
government that posses such a threat.[xxvi] Thus, presidents dictated the embargo policy
by executive order from 1960-1996, when Helms-Burton was passed. Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan and George Bush
Sr., all made various adjustments to the policy, but Washington never lifted the
economic embargo and when Clinton assumed office in 1992, it basically contained
the same provisions as it did when Kennedy imposed the embargo.
2.3.1 – The Cuban Democracy Act of 1992
By 1992, Cuba was no longer
receiving subsidies from the USSR, which had a detrimental impact on the
economy of the former. It seemed to be
an opportune time to tighten the embargo against Cuba’s government, as the
Soviet subsidies that allowed Castro to overcome the effects of the U.S.
embargo were no longer. If there was
ever a time when Castro’s stronghold on power was in question, this was
it. “Congressman Robert Torricelli
(D-N.J), the CDA’s principal architect, stated … that as a result of his
legislation, the Castro regime would fall within months.”[xxvii] Thus, the U.S. Congress strengthened the
embargo, while simultaneously allowing humanitarian aid to be administered to
benefit the Cuban people. This was the
first time the policies of the embargo were put forth in an act of Congress,
which clarified the U.S. policy.
The CDA took a two-track
approach to U.S. policy towards Cuba; one that would tighten the embargo,
denying Castro the benefits of economic relations with the U.S., and the other
permitting “support for the Cuban people,”[xxviii]
ensuring that they would not suffer as a result of strengthening the embargo.
Lastly, the CDA set forth the policy the U.S. would follow in the post-Castro
era. It required the U.S. to provide
“food, medicine, and medical supplies for humanitarian purposes”[xxix]
when a transitional government[xxx]
is established and permitted the president to “take steps to end the United States
trade embargo of Cuba”[xxxi]
once a democratic government[xxxii]
is in place.
2.3.2 – The CDA’s Measures that Tighten the Embargo
The CDA “attempted to
increase economic pressure on the Cuban government by prohibiting United States
subsidiaries of foreign companies from trading with Cuba and imposing
restrictions on sea transport by any vessel which had handled freight to and
from a Cuban port.”[xxxiii] This drew intense opposition from the
international community, as it increased the transportation costs associated with
shipping goods to Cuba by prohibiting vessels that entered a Cuban port from
loading or unloading freight in the U.S. for 180 days, which increased prices
in Cuba by 30%.[xxxiv] The Act
also imposed restrictions on foreign companies that were operating on American
soil.[xxxv] In addition, the CDA allowed Washington to
consider the willingness of other countries to cooperate with the U.S. embargo
policy when determining their relationship with the U.S.[xxxvi]
In 1992 “the General Assembly condemned the U.S. embargo by a vote of 88 to 3”[xxxvii]
for the first time, an act it annually has repeated to the present.
Moreover, the CDA ordered
the president to limit remittances to Cuba – ultimately set at $300 per
three-month period – from U.S. persons for the purpose of travel to the U.S.,
insuring that the remittances “are not used by the government of Cuba as a
means of gaining access to United States currency,”[xxxviii]
which would limit the effectiveness of the embargo. [xxxix] The CDA also set the maximum penalty at
$50,000 (currently $55,000, adjusted for inflation) for a violation of a policy
associated with the embargo.[xl]
2.3.3 – The CDA’s Provisions to Support the Cuban
People
The second-track of the CDA
offers support to the Cuban population, in order to ensure that the embargo
does not have an adverse impact on their well-being. It exempts donations of foods to nongovernmental organizations
and individuals in Cuba, as well as the export of medicines and medical
supplies from the trade restrictions.
However, such exports are subject to onsite inspections to ensure that
the “exported item is to be used for the purposes for which it was intended”[xli]
and persons and organizations who wish to export food and medicines must obtain
a specific license issued by the U.S. government before engaging in such
transactions. These restrictions have
limited the amount of food and medicines that have been exported to provide
assistance to the Cuban people.
The
CDA also opened telecommunications with Cuba to promote the flow of ideas that
are consistent with democratic values. [xlii] The provision led to the creation of Radio
and T.V. Martí. However, T.V. and Radio
Martí are “neither seen nor heard in Cuba,”[xliii]
as a result of efforts by the Castro government to prevent their transmission
to the island.[xliv] Thus, the impact of the CDA’s provisions to
support the Cuban people have had little impact due the restrictions they place
on exports of food and medicine and as a result of Castro’s efforts to prohibit
the influx of American ideas via telecommunication mediums.
2.4.1 – The Cuban Liberty and Solidarity Act of 1996
(Libertad and Helms-Burton)
In response to the failure
of the CDA to fall Castro, Congress passed the Cuban Liberty and Solidarity Act
of 1996, which imposed further restrictions on trade with Cuba. President Clinton initially opposed the
measure, but when two planes being flown in Cuba’s airspace by the
Cuban-American group Brothers to the Rescue were shot down by the Cuban Air
Force, he moved quickly to criticize the actions and signed Libertad into
law the following week.[xlv] This Act further galvanized international
opinion against the embargo, as “the closest trading allies of the United
States, including Canada and Mexico, expressed outrage at the [extraterritorial
nature of the] law and immediately threatened varied forms of retaliation.”[xlvi] Also, Cuban citizens “reacted with
disappointment and anger, recognizing that they would feel the brunt of”[xlvii]
Helms-Burton. The Act contains four
Titles, each of which deserves to be addressed independently.
2.4.2 – Title I: Strengthening International
Sanctions against the Castro Regime
Title I of Helms-Burton
codifies the U.S. embargo against Cuba into formal law, removing the
president’s power to lift the embargo unless Cuba has established a
transitional government.[xlviii] This “locks U.S. policy in place
indefinitely.”[xlix] Title I also states that the U.S. opposes
the admission of Cuba into the international financial institutions, such as
the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, and authorizes the U.S.
Treasury to withhold funds from the institutions if they provide loans to the
Cuban government (proportional to the amount of the loan).[l]
Lastly, “Title I restricts goods produced in third countries, which contain
Cuban inputs from being sold in the U.S. [, such as cigars manufactured in
Honduras with Cuban tobacco].”[li]
2.4.3 – Title II: Assistance to a Free Cuba
Title
II tightens the definition of a transitional government in Cuba established in
the CDA. It “specifies the exclusion of
Raul and Fidel Castro”[lii]
from such a government. The definition
also states that a transitional government must be making progress in returning
the expropriations that were taken from U.S. citizens by the Cuban government
following the Cuban Revolution.[liii] This provision includes compensation to U.S.
citizens, who were Cuban nationals in 1959 when nationalization occurred, which
includes “a large majority of immigrants from Cuba over the past
three-and-a-half decades.”[liv]
2.4.4 – Title III: Protection of the Property Rights
of U.S. Nationals
Title III of Helms-Burton
“gives U.S. nationals and corporations the right to sue foreign companies which
‘traffic’ in property expropriated from U.S. entities after the 1959 Cuban
Revolution.”[lv] Thus, any individual or government that
‘traffics’ in confiscated property “is liable for monetary damages in US
federal district courts.”[lvi] ‘Trafficking’ “is defined to include not
only selling, transferring, buying, or leasing the property in question, but
also ‘engag[ing] in a commercial activity using or otherwise benefiting from
confiscated property.’”[lvii] For example, if a Canadian company buys
tobacco from a Cuban state enterprise and the company also operates in the U.S.
“and accordingly is amenable to the judicial jurisdiction of the U.S. court,”[lviii]
it would be responsible to compensate a U.S. national for the purchase, if they
could prove that the tobacco the company bought came from a plantation that the
plaintiff owned prior to the expropriation.[lix]
Title
III also includes a provision permitting the president to suspend its
enforcement if he decides that “it is necessary to the national interests of
the United States and will expedite a transition to democracy in Cuba.”[lx]
On July 16, 1996, President Clinton enacted this provision, an action President
George W. Bush repeated, muting the effect of Title III.[lxi]
2.4d – Title IV: Exclusion of Certain Aliens from
Entry into the U.S.
Title IV of Helms-Burton
“establishes the mandatory denial of visas to individuals who traffic in
confiscated property,”[lxii]
including “senior officials or major stock holders, and their families, of the
companies that do business in Cuba on property expropriated from American
citizens.”[lxiii] “To date, executives from Italy, Mexico,
Canada and the United Kingdom have been barred”[lxiv]
from entering the U.S.
The
combination of Titles III and IV serve to “ensure that other countries respect
the US embargo,”[lxv] but these
measures have been less than effective because there is not any other
government in the world that complies with the U.S. embargo against Cuba.[lxvi]
2.5 – Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement
Act of 2000 (Cuban Food
and
Medicine Security Act)
By 2000, it was apparent the
provisions set forth in the CDA to provide humanitarian assistance to Cuba were
having a negligible impact due to the requirements that allowed for onsite
inspections and obligated organizations that wished to provide such support to
apply for specific licenses. In a
speech made on the senate floor, Senator Chris Dodd stated, “between 1992 and
mid-1997, the Commerce Department approved only 28 licenses for such sales,
valued at less than $1 million.”[lxvii] In response, Congress enacted the Trade
Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 (TSRA), ensuring that U.S.
policy was in line with the goal of providing assistance to the Cuban
people.
The
TSRA “prohibits the president from establishing unilateral food and medicine
sanctions against Cuba or any nation unless he can make a showing to Congress
that there is an emergency security risk.”[lxviii] The provision exempts “food and other
agricultural products (including fertilizer), medicines, medical supplies,
medical instruments, or medical equipment, or with respect to travel incident
to the sale or delivery”[lxix]
of such products from the trade restrictions.
However, the TSRA prohibits the government and private U.S. financial
institutions from providing credit to Cuba for such purchases.[lxx] Payments must be made in hard currency, not
Cuban pesos, which greatly limits the impact of the legislation, as Cuba is
cash strapped.[lxxi] According to the U.S.-Cuba Economic Council,
“Cuba has bought $282 million in agricultural goods”[lxxii]
since the passage of the TSRA, but little progress has been made in the area of
medicine and medical supplies due to their extremely high costs. Now that I have outlined the embargo policy
it is possible to access its utility in promoting U.S. interests.
3.1 – Actors and Arguments: The Pro-embargo Position
If the U.S. embargo against
Cuba has failed to fall Castro and to promote a transition to democracy, then
why has Washington not lifted the embargo?
This question can only be understood through the lens of electoral
politics, as the policy largely remains in place because of its support in the
Miami-Cuban community. 833,000[lxxiii]
Cubans live in Florida, with 564,000[lxxiv]
residing within Miami-Dade County; the most politically active and influential
of which support a hard-line policy towards Cuba. Florida has 25[lxxv]
electoral votes that are vital to success in presidential elections, which is
“the main reason that no president or candidate has been willing to seriously
consider ending the embargo.”[lxxvi] Presidents back anti-Castro policies in part
to gain the support of the Miami-Cuban community, a fact President Bush made
very apparent when he issued his Rose Garden Address on October 10, which
called for heightened enforcement of the travel ban. Despite growing domestic opposition to the embargo policy, Bush
chose to save face with the hard-line Miami-Cubans, hoping to gain their support
in the 2004 election.
3.1.2 – The Miami-Cuban Influence
It
is often assumed that the entire Miami-Cuban population is in favor of the U.S.
embargo, but this is not the case. “55%
of them believe the embargo has failed and that the United States should try a
new policy.”[lxxvii] However, the most influential Miami-Cuban
groups tend to support the embargo. The
initial wave of immigrants that came to the U.S. following the Cuban Revolution
were members of Cuba’s pre-revolutionary elite. Prior to the Revolution, many of the elites were associated with
the Batista regime, which held conservative beliefs. These political tendencies continue to dominate this group’s
outlook on policy. Castro nationalized
the properties elites and as a result they are emotionally charged to back
policies that injure him. In addition,
this group is highly educated, which has allowed them to assume the most
prominent roles in the Miami-Cuban community.[lxxviii]
“The Cuban American National
Foundation … is so powerful that when in full effect it can paralyze Congress
and even influence national trade policies. For example, the Libertad Act
… was a direct result of the outcry and anti-Castro fervor that erupted when
two U.S.-based Brothers to the Rescue planes were shot down by Cuban Migs.”[lxxix] Interestingly, there seems to be “a smaller
and smaller minority of hard-line exiles.”[lxxx] This is apparent in Bush’s decision not to
include the Cuban American National Foundation – “the group that was once
leaders of the hard-line approach”[lxxxi]
– in the audience of his Rose Garden address.
Instead, he “invited members of the Cuban Liberty Council, which broke
away from the foundation because, they said, it was too moderate.”[lxxxii] Thus, it is obvious that the consensus
amongst the Miami-Cuban population in support of the embargo is fading, a fact
that could allow the U.S. to move forward towards a proactive Cuba Policy.
3.1.3 – The Moral Argument
Despite the failure of the
embargo to remove the Castro government from power, many individuals continue
to favor the policy for its moral qualities.
There is no question that Castro commits human rights abuses, including
the imprisonment of his political opposition.
Freedom of speech is not a right that is guaranteed to the Cuban
population and many Americans refuse to back policies that aid in such
repression. Thus, regardless of whether
the embargo will fall Castro, they back it because they refuse to “give a
single dollar”[lxxxiii] to a
dictator who oppresses his population.
Although “there is no evidence that the economic sanctions against Cuba
have reduced Castro’s power and there are no indications that anything short of
an invasion will lead to his downfall,”[lxxxiv]
this lobby continues to support the embargo for its moral implications.
3.1.4 – The Embargo will fall Castro
Many supporters of the U.S.
embargo against Cuba still believe that the policy will lead to Castro’s
downfall. They point to the success of
the embargo against South Africa as an example of how economic sanctions can
serve to fall a repressive regime.
However, the embargo against South Africa was multilateral, drawing
support from many nations in the international community, a quality that the
embargo against Cuba does not possess. They contend that trade “props
up”[lxxxv]
the Castro regime, allowing him to retain his stronghold on power. From this perspective, the sanctions will
eventually weaken Castro to the point that the Cuban population will be able to
mount sufficient opposition to his rule to force a transition of
government. In this manner, they contend
the embargo will achieve the U.S. objective of promoting a transition to
democracy in Cuba.
3.2.1– Actors and Arguments:
Pro-engagement – Castro did not Fall During Cuba’s
Economic Crisis
As noted above, international
support for a policy of engagement towards Cuba increased considerably over the
past decade. Forty-three years of
economic sanctions have not forced Castro out of power; therefore, there is no
reason to believe that the continuation of the sanctions will lead to his
demise. Prior to the fall of the USSR,
Cuba was the recipient of $4.5 billion a year in direct subsidies from the
Soviet Union.[lxxxvi] The subsidies essentially allowed the Cuban
economy to stay afloat despite the economic sanctions that Washington imposed
on the island. “As a result, the U.S.
embargo did not have an effect on the Cuban economy until after 1991.”[lxxxvii] “Between 1989 and 1993, the country’s gross
domestic product fell 35 per cent and exports declined by 75 per cent,”[lxxxviii]
as a consequence of the loss of Soviet subsidies. However, even with the drastic contraction of the Cuban economy,
Castro’s rule was never seriously challenged. He adopted a series of economic
reforms including “the active promotion of foreign direct investment and other
types of financing, export promotion in services, particularly tourism, the
decentralization of foreign trade, [and] the implementation of a legal and
monetary framework to allow for the circulation of hard currency”[lxxxix]
to avoid an economic catastrophe. “On
15 March 1999, the United States Department of State … reported that an
estimated total of US$1.7 billion had been invested in the Republic of Cuba
since 1990,”[xc] which
partly offset the loss of Soviet subsidies, allowing the Cuban economy to survive
independently. “By 1995, Cuba was
registering a 2.5 percent growth rate, and by 1996, 7.6%.”[xci] “The economic progress achieved by Cuba in
the absence of Soviet aid bodes ill for the notion that Castro can be toppled
through … economic sanctions.”[xcii] If Castro did not tumble when his economy
was in crisis, it follows that the effects of the U.S. embargo will not serve
this end now that the Cuban economy is recovering.
3.2.2 – The Embargo Hurts the Cuban People
Opponents of the embargo
argue that the sanctions imposed by the U.S. against Cuba have worsened the
conditions the Cuban population is forced to cope with, “not weakened the Fidel
Castro.” [xciii] Prominent Human Rights groups, including
Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, argue that “the United States is
acting inhumanely by denying [the Cuban] people essentials like food and
medicine.” [xciv] As a result of the contraction in the Cuban
economy caused by the loss of Soviet subsidies and the strengthening of the
embargo under the CDA, “undernourishment increased from 4 per cent of the
population in 1990-1992 to 19 per cent in 1996-1998. Over the same period, the average daily food intake declined by
around 500 calories per person.”[xcv] Consequently, Cubans appear thinner than
other impoverished peoples throughout Latin America.[xcvi] The embargo also negatively impacts the
Cuban health care system, especially in terms of “the lack of access to inputs
and drugs in the North American market or from subsidiary companies in other
countries.” [xcvii] Thus, the Cuban people are hurt by the embargo,
which is contrary to the U.S. objective of supporting the Cuban people.
Critics also contend that
the Cuban people would benefit from trade with the U.S., even if the majority
of the economic gains are concentrated in the hands of the Castro government. “Giving money to the Castro budget still
creates more jobs”[xcviii]
and “much of what goes to the government ends up benefiting the people, for the
government provides free health care, education and other social services to
all.”[xcix]
Also, the economic reforms Castro undertook
in response to the loss of Soviet subsidies created a small market economy in
Cuba. Farmers are required to sell 80
percent of their crops to the Cuban government at an artificially low price,
but are allowed to sell the remaining 20 percent at markets that operate on
supply and demand in Cuba’s dollar economy.[c] Families are permitted to operate home
restaurants that operate on a market basis as well.[ci] Removing the restrictions on travel
associated with the embargo would greatly increase the number of dollars
flowing into these sectors of the Cuban economy, not to mention the amount of tips
– which go straight into the hands of the people – that would be generated in
the tourism industry as a result of increased travel. Ending the embargo would improve the lives of the Cuban people
and given the fact that Castro has not fallen to forty-three years of economic
sanctions, it is not justifiable to deny Cubans the benefits of economic
relations with the U.S.
3.2.3– The Embargo Hurts the American People
The American population
suffers consequences from the U.S. embargo against Cuba as well. The embargo draws bi-partisan opposition as
a result of its negative impact on U.S. businesses and farmers. The restrictions on trade seriously disadvantage
U.S. companies, as they allow foreign companies to establish market dominance
in the absence of U.S. competition.
“Business leaders point to the very honest fact that the embargo is
causing U.S. businesses to lose market share in Cuba to the Europeans and
Canadians.”[cii] Foreign direct investment in Cuba continues
to increase and as foreign companies further establish themselves in Cuba,
American companies fall farther behind in the race to establish market
share. Cuba’s pollution is 11 million
and while the population is poor, it represents an appealing market for U.S.
businesses. “The United States and Cuba
could do upwards of $3 billion a year in trade as soon as the embargo was
lifted, with the overall figure increasing very quickly to some $7 billion.”[ciii] According to the Cuba Policy Foundation, the
agricultural sector of the U.S. economy alone could sell “$1.24 billion
annually”[civ] in
agricultural products to Cuba if the embargo were lifted, persuading many
farm-state republicans to support the normalization of relations. The University of Colorado at Boulder
estimates that lifting the travel ban alone would “produce over $1.7 billion
[in business] and create 10,000 jobs for the U.S. travel sector,”[cv]
drawing backing from the airline unions and other groups in the tourism sector
of the economy. Thus, it is apparent
that American business would benefit from lifting the embargo, supporting the
claim that removing the sanctions serves the interests of the American
population.
3.2.4 – Engagement and the Flow of Ideas
Another
positive outcome of the normalization of U.S.-Cuban relations that is cited
concerns the increase in the flow of
ideas between the U.S. and Cuba that would result from lifting the embargo,
undermining Castro’s attempts to control the information that Cuban’s are
exposed to. From this perspective,
“engagement is the best way to open the channels of dialogue,” [cvi]
ultimately promoting a transition to democracy. However, the Castro government goes out of its way to isolate the
Cuban population from foreign contact, as it “does not allow Cuban citizens in
hotels, in resorts, and on most beaches;”[cvii]
the places where they are most likely to encounter foreign tourists carrying
such ideas. This demonstrates Castro’s
fear of western thought evidences the claim that the spread of such ideas would
aid the transition to democracy.
Despite Castro’s efforts to prevent the phenomenon, lifting the embargo
would increase the number of tourists that travel to the island and would help
to stimulate the flow of ideas, as there will inevitably be contact between the
foreign travelers and the Cuban people.
3.3 – The Role of the International Community and
the Failure of Unilateral
The
international community plays a vital role in undermining the impact of the
U.S. embargo. As mentioned earlier,
Cuba largely avoided economic catastrophe following the loss of subsides from
the USSR as a result of increased foreign investment in its economy. “Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada,
France, Great Britain, Israel, Italy, Mexico, and Spain”[cviii]
have all entered into joint ventures with the Castro government, making the
embargo “wholly unilateral in nature – and no unilateral embargo in history has
ever worked.”[cix] By investing in the Cuban economy, the international
community lessons the impact of the U.S. embargo. So long as it continues to engage in trade with Cuba, there is no
hope in falling Castro with economic sanctions. The U.S. must move beyond its anti-Castro policy and look towards
the future. If it aligns its policies
with those of the international community the prospects for a transition to
democracy will be furthered, as Castro no longer will be able to attribute
Cuba’s problems to the U.S. embargo.
4.1 – A Failed Policy that Must be Reformed
This analysis demonstrates that while the
U.S. embargo against Cuba was fairly successful in preventing Cuba from
spreading communism in the Western Hemisphere and thus was useful in achieving
the goal of containment, it is a failed policy in terms of promoting a
transition to democracy. When the
embargo was imposed the international environment was very different than it is
today and as a result the policy is an ineffective means of achieving
Washington’s current goals. The war on
communism is over, yet the U.S. still follows a policy that is dictated by Cold
War politics. The policy no longer
serves the interests of the U.S.
Instead of destabilizing Castro and promoting a transition to democracy,
the embargo empowers him to instill nationalism in the Cuban population,
legitimizing his rule. The policy is
such a failure Senator Baucus stated, “our effort to isolate Cuba through the
trade embargo … has failed to bring about human rights improvement, has
provided a pretext for Castro’s continued repression, makes the United States
the scapegoat of Castro’s failed economic policies, and hurts the Cuban
people.”[cx] It is thus evident that the policy neither
achieves the objectives of the U.S. nor contributes to a positive outcome. The embargo has weakened the Cuban economy,
which limits Castro’s ability to pose a military threat. But Castro is not in danger of being
overthrown. Castro was forced to adopt
market reforms as a consequence of the Cuban economic crisis in the mid-1990s,
however, the changes in economic policy were the result of the loss of Soviet
subsidies, not the embargo. The
hard-line U.S. policy harms both U.S. and Cuban citizens, while allowing Castro
to retain his monopoly on power. It is
time for reform; the U.S. embargo against Cuba is a failure and Washington must
“embark upon a proactive policy and seek to remove the present day restrictions
on doing business with the Cuban people”[cxi]
if it hopes to see a transition to democracy and respect for human rights in
Cuba.
4.2 – Toward the Future
While recent years witnessed heightened support in
America for the normalization of relations with Cuba, many opponents of the
embargo insist that Castro must make improvements in the area of human rights
and begin compensating U.S. nationals for the expropriations taken during the
Cuban Revolution before the U.S. lifts the embargo. These are noble goals, but Castro seems unwilling to make such
concessions at the present time. “Cuba
will always react to … U.S. pressures and threats by adopting a defensive
attitude … [which] produc[es] conditions that are the opposite of those that
might lead to greater openness and respect for the rights of the individual.”[cxii] Therefore, the economic sanctions lead to
further human rights violations, rather than pressuring Castro to change his
oppressive policies, which makes it difficult to condition rapprochement on
improvements in human rights. In
addition, the economic gains rendered from the normalization of relations with
Cuba would more than compensate for the $2 billion that is sought in
reparations.[cxiii] Thus, it is not practical to continue the
embargo against Cuba. The U.S. policy
must be forward-looking if Washington is going to be part of the transition to
democracy that will likely occur following Castro’s death. If the policy continues to focus on the
past, progress will not be made towards achieving the Washington’s objectives
and American and Cuban citizens will continue to suffer the consequences of the
hard-line economic policy. Castro’s
time is waning and the U.S. must act now.
The U.S. needs to align itself with the international community to
ensure its inclusion in the transitional process. “Canada and the nations of western Europe have maintained normal
economic relations with Cuba and simultaneously promoted a transition to
democracy.”[cxiv] There is no reason the U.S. cannot do the
same and doing so would position it to influence the transition to democracy in
Cuba. It also would improve the
position of the U.S. in the international community, furthering its interests
in the world beyond Cuba. Therefore,
Washington must realize that it is employing a counterproductive policy and
adopt a proactive approach to its relations with Cuba. Only then will the U.S. position itself to
promote a transition to democracy as well as respect for human rights.
4.3 – A Different Approach
Rather than focusing on Castro’s past human
rights violations and on compensation for expropriations, the U.S. should
concentrate on reestablishing relations with Cuba. Economic negotiations should center on improving the transparency
in Cuba’s economy. The Cuban government
is very secretive about its economic policies, however, normalizing relations
would allow the U.S. to condition economic engagement on improved transparency.
Increasing transparency serves two
ends: it informs the Cuban people of the actions taken by the Castro government
and it allows them to recognize the inefficiencies that are inherent in Cuba’s
socialist economic system. This will in
turn allow them to realize that many of the problems with the Cuban government
are not the consequence of the U.S. embargo and persuade them to support
changes in the structure of the government and the economy. Even if Castro refuses to improve the
transparency of his government, the resumption of economic relations would
allow the U.S. to access information regarding the actions of the Cuban
government. For example, if a U.S.
company entered into a joint venture with Cuba, it would pay the government for
the labor provided by Cuban citizens.
Castro would them pay the laborers a fraction of the total he
received. U.S. companies could
determine the difference and then distribute such information, which would
improve transparency in a de facto manner. This would undermine Castro’s legitimacy and could result in an
increase in opposition to his rule. “Lifting the embargo would give Castro
precisely what he fears most; it would empower his people to demand change.”[cxv] This is in line with the objective of
promoting a democratic transition in Cuba and thus the U.S. must resume
economic relations if it wants to see such a transition.
End Notes
[i] Department of State: United States of America, “U.S.-Cuba Relations.” Accessed 11/23/02. Available at: <www.state.gov/www/regions/wha/cuba/policy.html>. 2-3.
[ii] Kimberly Ann Elliott and Gary Clyde Hufbauer, “Same Song, Same Refrain? Economic Sanctions in the 1990’s.” In The American Economic Review, Volume: 89, Issue 2, Papers and Proceedings of the One Hundred Eleventh Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association, May, 1999, pp. 403-408. Accessed 11/23/03. Available at: <http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-8282%28199905%2989%3A2%3C403%3ASSSRES%3E2.0.CO%3B2-C>. 404.
[iii] Robert A. Pape, “Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work.” In International Security, Volume: 22, Issue 2, Autumn, 1997, pp. 90-136. Accessed 11/22/03. Available at: <http://links.jstor.org’sici?sici=0162-2889%28199723%2922%3A2%3C90%3AWESDNW%3E2.0.CO%3B2-X >. 96.
[iv] “Ending the Blockade.” AfroCubaWeb. Accessed 11/23/02. Available at: <www.afrocubaweb.com/embargo.html >. 3.
[vi] Rolando J. Santiago, “Y2K, The Millennium for a Revised U.S.–Cuba Trade Policy: Grounds for Removing the Embargo.” In NAFTA: Law and Business Review of the Americas, Volume: 6, Issue 2, Spring 2000. pp. 169-204. Accessed 11/23/2003. Available at: <http://proxy.lib.ohio-state.edu:2079/cgi-bin/search.pl?>. 177.
[vii] President George W. Bush. Speech. “President Bush Discusses Cuba Policy in Rose Garden Speech.” October 10, 2003. Accesses: 12/4/03. Available at: www.iee.com/research/topics/sanctions/cuba2.htm. 1.
[ix] “Case Studies in Sanctions and Terrorism: Case 60-3 U.S. v Cuba (1960 – Castro).” Accessed 11/23/2003. Available at: <www.iee.com/research/topics/sanctions/cuba2.htm>. 1.
[xii] General Wesley Clark, America Rocks the Vote: Democratic Candidates Forum. CNN. November 4, 2003. 7-8:30 p.m.
[xiii] Maggie Farley, “U.N. Still Spurns Cuba Embargo.” L.A. Times. Published November 5, 2003. Accessed 11/5/2003. Available at: <www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/la-fg-un5nov05,1,3062104.story>.
[xiv] Nick Anderson, “Ban on Travel May Survive.” L.A. Times. Published October 25, 2003. Accessed 10/27/2003. Available at: <www.latimes.com/la-na-cuba25oct25,1,2395487.story.>.
[xvi] Wayne S. Smith, “An Ocean of Mischief: Our Dysfunctional Cuban Embargo.” In Orbis, Volume:42, Issue 4, Autumn, 1998. pp. 533-554. 534. Accessed 11/23/03. Available at:< http://proxy.lib.ohio-state.edu:2079/local-cgi/send-pdf/031023184749212399.pdf>. 534.
[xxiii] Department of Treasury: United States of America, “Chronology of Cuba Travel Licensing Program.” Accessed 11/23/03. Available at: <www.ustreas.gov/offices/eotffc/ofac/speeches/tab2.pdf>. 1.
[xxv] Matias F. Travieso-Daz, Esq. and Shaw Pittman, “Requirements for Lifting the U.S. Trade Embargo Against Cuba.” Accessed 11/23/03. Available at: <http://lanic.utexas.edu/la/cb/cuba/asce/cuba3/travieso_fn.html >. 2.
[xxviii] Department of State: United States of America, “Title XVII – Cuban Democracy Act of 1992.” Accessed 11/23/03. Available at: <www.state.gov/www/regions/wha/cuba/democ_act_1992.html>. 3.
[xxx] Ibid., 5. Section 1707 of the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 defines a transitional government in Cuba as a government that “1. has made a public commitment to hold free and fair elections for a new government within six months and is proceeding to implement that decision; 2. has made a public commitment to respect, and is respecting, internationally recognized human rights and basic democratic freedoms; and 3. is not providing weapons or funds to any group, in any other country, that seeks the violent overthrow of the government of that country.”
[xxxi] Ibid., 5. Section 1708 of the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 defines a democratic government in Cuba as a government that “1. has held free and fair elections conducted under internationally recognized observers; 2. has permitted opposition parties ample time to organize and campaign for such elections, and has permitted full access to the media to all candidates in the elections; 3. is showing respect for the basic civil liberties and human rights of Cuban citizens; 4. is moving toward establishing a free market economic system; and 5. has committed itself to constitutional change that would ensure regular free and fair elections that meet requirements of paragraph (2).”
[xxxiii] United Nations General Assembly, “Report of the Secretary-General-Necessity of ending the economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed by the United States against Cuba.” August, 24 2001. Accessed 11/23/03. Available at: <www.un.org/documents/ga/56/a56276a1.pdf>. 5.
[xxxv] Department of State: United States of America, “Title XVII – Cuban Democracy Act of 1992.” 4.
[xxxviii] Department of State: United States of America, “Title XVII – Cuban Democracy Act of 1992.” 4.
[xlii] Department of Treasury: United States of America, “Chronology Cuba Travel Licensing Program.” 2.
[xlv] Andrew F. Lowenfeld, “Congress ad Cuba: The Helms-Burton Act.” In The American Journal of International Law, Volume 90, Issue 3, July, 1996, pp. 419-434. Accessed 11/16/03. Available at: <http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-9300%28199607%2990%3A3%3C419%3ACACTHA%3E2.0.CO%3B2-G >. 419.
[xlvi] Michael O’Heaney, “A Closer Look at the Helms-Burton Law.” Accessed 11/23/03. Available at: <www.globalexchange.org/countries/cuba/usacuba/HelmsBurton.html.pf>. 1.
[xlviii] Stephen A. Lisio, “Helms-Burton and the Point of Diminishing Returns.” In International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), Volume 72, Issue 4, The Americas: European Security, Oct., 1996, pp. 691-711. Accessed 11/16/03. Available at: <http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0020-5850%28199610%2972%3A4%3C691%3AHATPOD%3E2.0.CO%3B2-S>. 694.
[lxvii] Senator Chris Dodd. Speech, “Cuban Food and Medicine Security Act of 1999.” April 29, 1999. Accessed 11/28/03. Available at: <http://dodd.senate.gov/press/Speeches/106_99/0429.htm>. 2.
[lxviii] “House Votes to Lift Cuba Embargo on Food and Medicine.” UPI. June 27, 2000. Accessed 11/28/03. Available at: <www.newsmax.com/articles/print.shtml?a=2000/6/27/71153>.
[lxix] Senator Chris Dodd, “Cuban Food and Medicine Security Act of 1999 (Introduced in the Senate).” April, 26, 1999. Accessed 11/28/03. Available at: <www.cubasolidarity.net/s926.html>. 1.
[lxx] Ted Barrett, “House leaders agree to lift food and medicine embargo against Cuba.” June 27, 2000. Accessed 11/28/03. Available at: <www.cnn.com/2000/ALLPOLITICS/stories/06/27/cuba.sanctions/>. 1.
[lxxii] Christopher Marquis, “Senate Approves Easing of Curbs on Cuba Travel.” New York Times. Published October 24, 2003. Accessed 11/10/03. Available at: <www.cubacentral.com/article.asp?ID=75>. 2-3.
[lxxiii] “Cubans still largest Hispanic group, but others catching up.” Florida Today, Published May, 10 2001. Accessed 12/2/03. Available at: <www.floridatoday.com/news/census2000/stories/2001/may/census051001a.htm>. 1.
[lxxiv] “Demographic Data: Hispanic Population.” The Beacon Council. Accessed 12/2/03. Available at: <www.beaconcouncil.com/010204.asp>.
[lxxv] “Florida Legislature Moves on Electors.” Newsmax.com. December 11, 2000. Accessed 12/2/2003. Available at: <www.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2000/12/11/131521.shtml>.
[lxxvi] Sheldon Richman, “The Evils of Economic Sanctions.” 1997. Accessed 11/23/03. Available at: <www.fff.org/freedom/0297c.asp>. 3.
[lxxvii] Wayne S. Smith, “Bush, Congress at odds on Cuba.” Atlanta Journal-Constitution. Published November 3, 2003. Accessed 11/10/03. Available at: <http://ciponline.org/cuba/cubainthenews/newsarticles/cot03/ajc110303smith.htm>. 1.
[civ] Cuba Policy Foundation, “Lifting the Travel Ban Benefits America’s Farmers.” February 5, 2003. Accessed 11/10/03. Available at: <http://cubafoundation.org/CPF%20travel-Ag%20Study/Release-Cuba-Travel-0302.htm>. 1.
[cxv] Santiago 188.
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